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Chequered Accounts: Truth, Justice and the Judiciary in Post Authoritarian 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
While it has been recognised that the judiciary plays an important role in 
contemporary governance,
1
 accountability of the judiciary for its role in authoritarian 
polities remains a largely elided issue in transitional justice arrangements. The role of 
the judiciary in Nigeria’s truncated experience of truth-seeking draws attention to the 
need for accountability for its role in post-authoritarian societies and potential pitfalls 
inherent in the continued lack of focus on the issue in transitional contexts. The 
purview of the truth-seeking process, as a transitional justice mechanism, ought as a 
matter of policy, to be extended to scrutiny of the judicial role. 
 
Judicial accountability for its role in past governance is important. On one hand, it has 
emerged that the judiciary plays a significant role in governance in authoritarian 
societies.
2
 On the other, experiential accounts strongly suggest that the judiciary 
usually assumes a strategic role in post-authoritarian transitions.
3
 This is especially the 
case with regard to issues of human rights, governance, efforts at democratic 
consolidation, and (re) institution of rule of law.
4
 The accountability gap on the 
judicial function saddles the transitional society with an untransformed judiciary, 
challenged by unresolved legitimacy questions. The set of dynamics at play in post-
authoritarian contexts suggests the need for more critical focus on the judicial function 
in transitional justice processes. 
 
This chapter argues that neglect of judicial accountability for the past has resonance 
for achieving the aims of truth and justice for victims of gross violations of human 
rights as well as wider issues of transitional justice. Moreover, the contextual analysis 
suggests that neglecting judicial accountability for its role in past governance as a 
                                               
1
 For an interesting sample of the expanding body of literature on ‘judicialisation of politics’ and 
‘constitutionalisation of politics’ in liberal democracies as well as authoritarian societies see LEE 
EPSTEIN, et al ‘‘The Role of Constitutional courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic 
Systems of Government’’ (2001), 35 (1) Law & Society Review 117, RAN HIRSCHL (2004), Towards 
Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA 2004), RAN HIRSCHL ‘‘The New Constitutionalism and the Judicialization of Pure 
Politics Worldwide’’ (2006) 75 (2) 721, TOM GINSBURG Judicial Review in New Democracies 
(Cambridge University Press New York 2003), SAMUEL ISAACHAROFF ‘‘Democracy and Collective 
Decision Making,’’ International Journal of Constitutional Law (2008) 6 (2) 231-66 and HEINZ KLUG 
Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism and South Africa’s Political Reconstruction (Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge 2000).   
2 MOUSTAFA TAMIR The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law Politics and Economic Development 
in Egypt (Cambridge University Press New York 2007) TOM GINSBURG and MOUSTAFA TAMIR 
Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge New York 2008). 
3JOHN MORISON, KIERAN MCEVOY and GORDON ANTHONY (eds.) Judges, Transition and 
Human Rights (Oxford University Press Oxford 2007) 2 
4
 See JOHN MORISON, KIERAN MCEVOY and GORDON ANTHONY “Judges, Transition and 
Human Rights: Essays in Memory of Stephen Livingstone” in MORISON, MCEVOY and ANTHONY 
note 2 supra 2-3 and WOJCIECH SADURSKI Rights Before Courts: A Study of Constitutional Courts in 
Post Communist States of Central and Eastern Europe (Springer Dordrecht 2005) 
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measure of transitional justice threatens institutional transformation, an important 
aspect of post-authoritarian state-building.
5
 The absence of transformation at times of 
political change threatens not only rule of law but also, the transition project as a 
whole. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organised in this way. Part I examines the authoritarian past 
providing a glimpse of the contextual background to the discussion. It briefly 
describes the circumstances that necessitated the truth-seeking process in Nigeria. The 
process of political change to civil rule and the transitional justice measures that 
accompanied it, especially the course of the truth-seeking process embodied in the 
Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (the Commission or Oputa Panel) 
is examined in the next part. In Part III, the focus turns to the tension generated by the 
interaction of the judiciary and the truth-seeking process. The discussion in this part 
sets the foundation for advancing the need to incorporate judicial accountability for 
the past into transitional justice arrangements. The case for judicial accountability in 
post-authoritarian societies is argued in Part IV. Normative arguments for and against 
the case for judicial accountability for the past are analysed in this part. In Part V, the 
chapter takes further the discussion in the Part IV by extending it to an experiential 
account of the Nigerian situation. The chapter concludes that the neglect of judicial 
accounts, apart from providing an incomplete account of the past, ill-situates the 
judiciary for the usually challenging responsibilities it has to shoulder in societal 
transformation following the experience of authoritarianism.     
  
1. THE AUTHORITARIAN PAST 
 
Like many other countries in sub-Sahara Africa, most of Nigeria’s post-independent 
political experience was one of authoritarian rule. The military ruled the country for 
nearly three decades with two short intervals of civil governance.
6
 Military 
authoritarianism virtually destroyed the fabric of state and society. Economic and 
social well being of the people nose-dived as the military acted like an army of 
occupation misruling captured territory. All institutions of civil governance suffered 
debilitation as the military ruled with draconian decrees that undermined the 
constitution. These ‘laws’ either suspended parts of or asserted supremacy (and were 
judicially so upheld) over the constitution.
7
 
 
Gross violations of human rights were rampant to the extent that the country acquired 
pariah status within the international community. State security agencies, the armed 
forces and police alike commonly applied lethal force against the civil populace 
especially those actively engaged in organised opposition to authoritarian rule. 
Journalists, labour unions, student groups, political associations, market associations, 
human rights activists and organisations and the Bar Association were usual targets of 
state violence. Government measures against these and similar groups included 
                                               
5 RAMI MANI Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice or the Nexus between Development and Transitional Justice” (2008) 2 
(3) International Journal of Transitional Justice 253-265, 255-265 and NATASCHA ZUPAN and SYLVIA SERVAES 
Transitional Justice and Dealing with the Past (Working Group on Development and Peace, FriEnt, Germany 2007) available at: 
www.frient.de/en/ (24 May 2009) 1-32. 
6 The country was under civil democratic rule from 1 October 1960–15 January 1966 and from 1 
October 1979 to 31 December 1983. 
7 HAKEEM O. YUSUF Calling the Judiciary to Account for the Past: Transitional Justice and Judicial 
Accountability in Nigeria (2008) 30 (2) Law & Policy 194-226, 207-219. 
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proscription, illegal arrests, detention, seizure of property and arson, mysterious 
disappearances as well as state-sponsored murder. 
 
There were public executions in violation of constitutional provisions on due process. 
The execution of leading environmental activist and renowned author Kenule Saro-
Wiwa and some other members of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People 
(MOSOP) referred to as the ‘Ogoni nine’ particularly caught international attention 
leading to the suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth. The administration of 
General Sanni Abacha (November 1993-June 1998) was especially noted for its 
ruthlessness to political opposition and the struggle for democracy in the country. 
 
Successive military regimes perfected plunder, compromised all institutions of state 
and generally directed them towards flagrant violations of human rights of the people. 
Regime after regime declared an intention to pursue a development agenda, economic 
rectitude, unity and peace of the country. None of these commendable objectives was 
achieved by the numerous putsches and coups. Rather, the military institutionalised 
corruption even as the country moved rapidly down the ladder of development 
descending into one of the twenty poorest nations in the world despite abundant 
human and natural resources. 
8
 Predictably, rule of law took the uncomfortable back 
seat in affairs of governance. 
 
2. POLITICAL CHANGE AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN NIGERIA   
 
On the sudden death of General Sanni Abacha in June 1998, his successor, General 
Abdusalam Abubakar, embarked on an accelerated civil transition program. This 
culminated in the election and hand-over of power to political office holders at the 
three levels of governance and the exit of the military on 29 May 1999. Even as the 
political transition programme of the Abubakar regime progressed, the foregoing state 
of affairs in the country set up the imperative to put in place some measure of 
transitional justice to counter impunity. It had become important to ensure state 
acknowledgment for the misrule of the country by the military and secure reparations 
for victims of gross violations of human rights.  
 
The first measure took the form of prosecution. This was a half-hearted attempt by the 
departing Abubakar regime to prosecute a handful of some of the most prominent 
actors in the Abacha regime generally believed to be involved in gross violations of 
human rights. There was also at the time, a largely symbolic internal lustration of 
‘political’ military officers from active service - those who had participated in 
governance at various levels in the country- and were still serving in the armed forces. 
However, the truth-seeking process initiated by the (then) newly inaugurated civil 
administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo remains the notable transitional justice 
mechanism adopted in the post-authoritarian period.  
 
Barely two weeks after assuming office President Obasanjo announced the 
establishment of the Oputa Panel to investigate gross violations of human rights that 
took place in the country during the period of military rule.
9
 Addressing gross 
violations of human rights, ensuring justice for victims as well as the need to ‘heal the 
                                               
8World Bank Group: World Development Indicators available at:   
http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/ (7 November 2006). 
9 It was inaugurated on 14 June 1999. 
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nation’ had featured as topical issues in the presidential election campaigns. Not 
surprisingly, at his inaugural address to the country, President Obasanjo could not 
ignore it. He commended ‘home-based fellow Nigerians’ for their fortitude in bearing 
‘unprecedented hardship, deprivation of every conceivable rights and privileges that 
were once taken for granted.’10 
 
The Oputa Panel was established under the hand of President Obasanjo through 
Statutory Instrument No.8 of 1999
11
 pursuant to Tribunals of Inquiry Act (TIA).
 12
 Its 
mandate was principally to ascertain all incidents of gross violations of human rights 
committed in Nigeria between 15 January 1966 and 28 May 1999, the last day of 
military rule in the country. It was also to recommend appropriate measures to redress 
past injustices and prevent future violations of human rights in the country. The Oputa 
Panel was further mandated to suggest measures to foster rule of law which had been 
violently displaced during the years of military dictatorship.
13
 
 
Constrained by factors like limited personnel, time and financial resources, it heard 
only 200 petitions at its public hearings out of some 10,000 it received. There was 
thus a great disparity between the petitions submitted to the Oputa Panel and those 
actually heard in public. While the number of cases selected for the public hearings 
was limited, it took testimony from some 2,000 witnesses; received 1,750 exhibits 
related to them and publicly named alleged perpetrators of gross violations of human 
rights. In recognition of the need to address the large number of unheard cases of 
human rights violations, the Oputa Panel commissioned research reports by experts. 
These reports played an important part in the work of the truth-seeking process 
inasmuch as they reached out to areas and victims the Oputa Panel did not cover 
thereby providing a vital voice to an otherwise ‘voiceless’ majority. 
 
The public hearings were of a general and institutional nature. They were held in the 
six geo-political zones of the country from 24 October 2000 to 9 November 2001. The 
general hearings centred on individual complaints. The institutional hearings were 
organised for civil society, human rights groups and specialised professional 
organisations. The latter hearings featured testimonies and submissions from the 
National Human Rights Commission, the Armed Forces, the Police, State Security 
Service, the Nigeria Prisons, about ten civil society and human rights organisations 
and a few individuals. The choice of state institutions, with the notable exception of 
the National Human Rights Commission, may have been informed by the popular 
view that they constitute notorious sources of human rights violations. The National 
Human Rights Commission for its part was set up precisely to monitor human rights 
implementation in various aspects of national life, ironically by the Abacha junta. The 
                                               
10
 Nigeria World “Inaugural Speech by His Excellency, President Olusegun Obasanjo following his 
Swearing-in as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on May 29, 1999” available at: 
http://nigeriaworld.com/feature/speech/inaugural.htm (1 September 2007). 
11
 This was amended by Statutory Instrument No.13 of 1999. See Foreword by the Chairman, Synoptic 
Overview Oputa Panel Report: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations (2004) available 
at:http://www.dawodu.com/oputa1.htm (17 May 2009). The site also has the full report. 
12
  No. 447, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990, this was originally enacted as colonial 
legislation. 
13 For a detailed account of the work and challenges that confronted the Oputa Panel see HAKEEM 
O. YUSUF ‘Travails of Truth: Achieving Justice for Victims of Impunity in Nigeria’ (2007) 1 (2) 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 268-286. 
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hearings on the Police and the Prisons Service, institutions intimately connected to the 
criminal justice system, highlighted the need for the third key player, the judiciary to 
be brought to accounts for its role in governance but the Oputa Panel neglected to 
advert to it. 
 
A broad spectrum of stakeholders, including the political elite, journalists, legal 
practitioners, former political officer holders (and civil society leaders took their turn 
to give testimony at the public hearings).
 14
 The human rights violations they suffered 
were allegedly perpetrated by the army, the security agencies and the police. There 
were also some claims against corporate bodies. By the time it left office, the military 
establishment had instituted a ‘vicious cycle’ of violence exhibited in domestic 
violence, armed robbery, brigandage, religious riots, impunity and lawlessness in the 
polity.
15
 
 
According to the Oputa Panel, the criteria for hearing the chosen petitions were 
consideration of the nature of the rights involved and the extent or degree of the 
infringement(s) alleged. The nature of the violations disclosed in the petitions centred 
principally on the right to life, the right to personal liberty and the right to human 
dignity. In line with these criteria, petitions were further scrutinised to determine 
whether the alleged infringement was ‘gross.’ What constituted ‘gross violations’ of 
human rights was nowhere defined in the terms of reference or legislation which 
established the Oputa Panel. The Oputa Panel had recourse among others to the 
definition of the term in section 1 of the South Africa TRC Act, international human 
rights instruments and the Nigerian constitution which guaranteed the rights it 
identified to be in issue. 
 
In view of its expansive mandate, expectations were high that the Oputa Panel would 
contribute extensively to social reconstruction in Nigeria. With the awareness of the 
nature of public expectations and the benefit of its liberally worded mandate, the 
Oputa Panel’s recommendations extended beyond investigations of alleged violations 
of human rights to include a propositional agenda for transformation of Nigerian 
society. It proceeded on the premise that the truth-seeking process provided an 
opportunity to lay the foundations for social reconstruction and reconciliation. 
However, the aftermath of the truth process was disappointing. Finally, it is apt here to 
mention an important feature of the TIA under which the Oputa Panel was set up. This 
is the power to subpoena witnesses and documents. The Oputa Panel also had powers 
to order the arrest of any individual it determined was or had acted in contempt of it. 
These ‘coercive’ powers, as will be discussed below led to contentious litigation 
against the Panel by former military rulers. Wary of the accountability process, their 
challenge of these powers laid the foundations for the unsavoury judicial role in 
truncating the implementation of the Oputa Panel’s wide-ranging recommendations. 
 
3. UNDOING TRUTH AND JUSTICE: THE DELE GIWA PETITION AND 
THE JUDICIARY 
 
The judiciary remains not only unaccounted for its role in the period of authoritarian 
rule but played a significant part in the current experience of a failed transitional 
                                               
14 Included in the ranks were former President Shehu Shagari, the country’s first executive 
president and President Olusegun Obasanjo in his erstwhile capacity as military head of state. 
15 Synoptic Overview note 11 supra. 
 6 
justice process in the country. This came about by its jurisprudential choices in the 
litigation that was generated by the Dele Giwa petition. 
 
Dele Giwa was a Lagos-based investigative journalist, editor in chief and publisher of 
Newswatch, renowned for seminal and credible reporting of sensitive matters of 
public interest in the 80’s. His professional career was cut short in 1986 by a letter-
bomb allegedly delivered by military intelligence on the orders of the (then) military 
ruler, General Ibrahim Babangida. The police investigation into the matter was 
abandoned and closed prematurely. Efforts by his solicitor, Gani Fawehinmi, to 
investigate and secure private as well as public prosecution of the alleged perpetrators 
of the dastardly act were frustrated by the military government through the passage of 
special legislation.
16
 
 
Fawehinmi submitted a petition on the matter to the Oputa Panel calling for 
investigation into the murder to be reopened. The latter issued summons for the 
appearance of the ex-military ruler and his two security chiefs accused of complicity 
in the matter. To stave off the summons, the generals rushed to the High Court with an 
ex parte application to restrain the Oputa Panel from having them testify before it. 
This was in Justice Chukwudifu Oputa (Rtd.) and Human Rights Violations 
Investigation Commission and Gani Fawehinmi, v General Ibrahim Babangida, 
Brigadier Halilu Akilu and Brigadier Kunle Togun (the Oputa Panel Case).
 17
 They 
sought among other things a declaration that the President lacked the powers to act 
under the existing law to establish a body like the Oputa Panel for the whole country. 
They also claimed the summons contravened their right to liberty. 
 
Meanwhile, a legal team applied to represent the generals at the public hearing. This 
move, opposed by the petitioners, raised important questions about the proper role and 
capacity of legal counsel in the truth-seeking process. The contention was whether the 
Oputa Panel had the power to issue and serve summonses on them and having 
objected to appear, could the generals give and cross-examine evidence by proxy? The 
issue as framed by the Oputa Panel itself was whether or not proceedings before a 
truth commission constituted a suit at law or a judicial proceeding. The Oputa Panel 
took the view that proceedings before a truth-seeking commission like itself did not 
constitute adversarial proceedings. Thus, personal attendance of the summoned 
generals was required for the proper fulfilment of its mandate. It maintained that 
witnesses were bound to attend in person in order to be entitled to the rights of legal 
representation, and (cross-) examination. 
 
The foregoing appeared to be novel issues at the time they were raised in objection 
before the Nigerian court during the proceedings of the Oputa Panel. It is unclear 
                                               
16Despite the frustrations he met in his quest to bring the killers of the prominent journalist to 
justice, he remained vocal and committed to the matter till his death in 2009. See for instance, O 
Ojo “21 Years after Dele Giwa’s Murder- Fawehinmi to Govt: Reopen Case” The Guardian Online 
Edition (Lagos Saturday 20 October 2007.  
17
 [2003] M.J.S.C 63. This is the report of the defendants’ appeal to the Supreme Court following 
the victory of ‘the Generals’ at the Court of Appeal. Reference will however be made in a 
composite manner to the matter through the court of first instance (Federal High Court) through to 
the Supreme Court. Reference to ‘Courts’ in the following context will cover all three courts except 
as specifically stated. For discussion of the case and others in the context of transformative 
constitutionalism see HAKEEM O YUSUF ‘The Judiciary and Constitutionalism in Transitions: A 
Critique’ (2007) 7 (3) Global Jurist 1-47.  
 7 
whether they have been raised in objection to any other truth-seeking process after the 
Oputa Panel. The TIA did not provide for proxy representation of witnesses. 
However, if the settled position of the law (at least in common law jurisdictions) on 
witnesses in civil and criminal litigation can be extrapolated, legal counsel can not 
take the place of witnesses. In other words, testimony is a personal issue that can not 
be delegated and stands apart from the right to legal representation.
18
 It arguably 
would have amounted to a fundamental contradiction in terms in a truth-seeking 
process for alleged perpetrators of rights violations to testify by proxy. 
 
Nonetheless, the generals, with the sanction of an injunction granted by the trial court, 
held out throughout the public hearings.
19
 The matter eventually found its way to the 
Supreme Court (the Court). It held that the Constitution does not confer powers on the 
National Assembly to enact a general law on tribunals of inquiry for the whole 
country and so it was a matter within the competence of the states only. The president 
exceeded his jurisdiction in establishing the Oputa Panel with a remit to carry out a 
national inquiry into the violations of human rights in all parts of the country. The 
Court also upheld the lower court’s finding that certain sections of the enabling statute 
were unconstitutional and invalid for conferring the power on a tribunal of inquiry to 
compel attendance or impose a sentence of fine or imprisonment.
20
 The sections, the 
Court held, contravene sections 35 and 36 of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 that 
provide for the right to liberty and fair hearing respectively. 
 
The Oputa Panel Case eloquently calls attention to two of a number of unsettling 
features of the legal and statutory framework of governance in Nigeria’s political 
transition. First is the extensive reliance by all branches of government on autocratic 
legislation deriving from the colonial past and authoritarian military regimes. This is 
reflected in the way an elected civil government placed reliance on the TIA, a pre-
republican legislation to set up a truth commission by executive fiat at a time it had 
become standard practice to do so under purpose-specific legislation.
21
 Secondly is a 
customary, uncritical adherence to judicial precedent by the courts even at the highest 
level. The courts relied on and referred extensively to Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa & 
Others v Doherty &Others (Balewa)
22
 in which the then Federal Supreme Court 
(FSC) and the Privy Council had both upheld objections to the compulsive powers and 
the jurisdictional reach of the TIA. The contentious value of judicial precedents 
particularly in the common law legal tradition is outside the scope of this work.
23
 
                                               
18 This position is consistent with practise elsewhere. For example Legal Notice No.5 of 1986 in 
Uganda which created the country’s Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights 
(1986-1994) provides that ‘…any person desiring to give evidence to the Commission shall do so 
in person’. Emphasis added. 
19
 The first decision in the matter, by the Court of Appeal, was delivered on 31 October 2001, ten 
days after the conclusion of the public hearings. 
20
 Sections 5(d) 11(1) (b), 11 (4) and 12(2) of the Tribunals of Inquiry Act. 
21
 Thus the South-Africa and Ghana truth commissions which closely preceded and succeeded the 
Nigerian truth-seeking process respectively were set up pursuant to tailor-made legislation. For a fairly 
comprehensive and representative discussion of the establishment and conduct of truth-seeking 
processes in different parts of the world, see PRISCILA B HAYNER Unspeakable Truths: Facing the 
Challenge of Truth Commissions (Routledge New York 2002) 94.  
22
(1963) 1 WLR 949 
23 For a succinct discussion of the role of precedent in the work of judges see LEE EPSTEIN and JACK 
KNIGHT ‘Courts and Judges’ in AUSTIN SARAT (ed.) Blackwell Companion to Law and Society 
(Blackwell Publishing Malden MA and Oxford 2004) 184-187. 
 8 
Suffice to note however that since 1963,
24
 the Court is neither bound in fact nor law 
by the decisions of both authorities. On one hand, the FSC from that year became the 
Court of Appeal and the (then) newly constituted Supreme Court (the Court), not the 
Privy Council in London, was constitutionally designated the highest judicial forum 
for the country. Thus, in relying on Balewa, the Court effectively relied on a lower 
court’s decision to deny the opportunity for truth and justice for victims of gross 
violations of human rights in the country. 
 
Clearly, the political branch, in its failure to inaugurate the truth-seeking process 
through a purpose-designed legislation bears considerable responsibility for the shaky 
legal foundations of the Oputa Panel. Such reliance in the aftermath of three decades 
of authoritarian rule that earned the country international censor
25
 raises fundamental 
questions. It puts to doubt the administration’s commitment to justice, human rights 
and the reinstitution of rule of law in the country. Notwithstanding the neglect of the 
political branch, there is cause to question the attitude of the transition judiciary. 
Considering its opportune institutional memory, its continued preference for legal 
formalism is out of tune with the times. 
 
The preference for legal formalism with its emphasis on plain-fact jurisprudence
26
 is 
at the heart of judicial imperviousness to the dynamics of transition that ought to be a 
paramount consideration in the Oputa Panel Case. The plain-fact jurisprudential 
approach of the judiciary in this case betrayed the fundamental lack of engagement 
with the socio-political circumstances of the country and legal developments in the 
international arena. It reflected judicial resistance to much desired need for socio-
political change. In coming to a decision that struck at the root of the truth-seeking 
process, the Nigerian judiciary in the Oputa Panel Case arguably undermined the rule 
of law at an important juncture in the country’s transition to civil governance. 
 
The Court obviously accorded primacy to protecting the federal character of the 
polity over the rights of victims of gross violations of human rights. Moreover, there 
is the part of the Court’s decision that held mandatory attendance at a truth 
commission as contrary to the right to personal liberty. This aspect of the decision in 
the Oputa Panel case, even from the purely formal legal point of view, is, with 
respect, not sustainable.  The Court held that constitutionally, only a court of law can 
make an order to deprive a citizen of the right to liberty. 
 
However, under the Nigerian constitution of 1999 as well as earlier constitutions, and 
indeed in line with international human rights law and practice, the right to liberty can 
be derogated from in defined circumstances. One such context is where there is 
reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offence, which was precisely in issue 
before the Oputa Panel. Section 35 (1) (b)  provides in part that personal liberty may 
be curtailed in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation  imposed upon him by 
law.
27
 The Court, on the basis of this proviso, ought to have upheld the ‘coercive’ 
                                               
24 When the country became a republic. 
25 STUART MOLE “The 2003 Nigerian Elections: A Democratic Settlement?” (2003) 370 The Round 
Table 423,424. 
26
 DAVID DYZENHAUS Judging the Judges, Judging Ourselves: Truth, Reconciliation and the 
Apartheid 
Legal Order (Hart Publishing Oxford 2003) 16. 
27
 Emphasis mine. 
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powers of the Oputa Panel under the 1999 Constitution. After all, the Oputa Panel was 
constituted under a law and the duty to attend its summons challenged by the 
Plaintiffs was a statutory one. 
 
In this regard, it is essential to recall that a truth commission has an extended form of 
inquiry as its core function. This core function can be easily frustrated or defeated if it 
lacks the power to summon witnesses and issue subpoena for the production of 
evidence. Indeed, as a matter of practice, such power is not at all novel for quasi-
judicial bodies in the Nigerian context. Similar powers are statutorily conferred and 
exercised with judicial sanction by some professional disciplinary bodies in the 
country.
28
 
 
It was also imperative in the context of the Oputa Panel Case to consider the 
imperatives of the transition moment. The need for restoring the rule of law, securing 
reparations for victims of gross violations of human rights and transformation of 
societal institutions, required an activist consideration of the issues arising from the 
truth-seeking process. It is pertinent that in the context of the transition in Nigeria, the 
rights of victims to obtain a remedy in view of executive choices devolved largely on 
the outcome of the truth-seeking process. The Court, in handing down the Oputa 
Panel decision the way it did, neglected to reckon with the fact that the nation was at 
the threshold of history, in transition and making a decisive break with a past of 
human rights violations. It was quite open to the Supreme Court as the judicial forum 
of last resort to have taken the expansive view of the facts and law and opt for a 
jurisprudence reflecting not a ‘legalistic’ consideration of the issues in contention but 
an activist posture sensitive to the ‘ideals of the nation’.29 
 
Indeed, the socio-political circumstances of the country at the time required the courts 
to adopt a reflexive jurisprudence in the determination of the Oputa Case. A broader 
perspective commends the view that the issues involved may no doubt 
‘offend’30individual rights. Yet, they also border even if implicitly, on the obligation 
of the country to ensure that victims of gross human rights violations are provided 
with an opportunity to be heard and provided an effective remedy. The Court’s 
position could have been different if it took a purposive approach to the legislation in 
question. Such an approach would allow it to uphold the establishment of the Oputa 
Panel for investigating past human rights violations as a measure for ensuring ‘order 
and good government of the Federation or any part thereof.’ 31 This power is conferred 
on the federal government by section 4(1) of the Nigeria constitution of 1999. 
                                               
28
 See for instance, the Medical and Dental Practitioners Act Cap 221 (now Cap M8, 2004) Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria 1990 which establishes the Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria (MDCN).  
The Act empowers the MDCN to enact rules of professional conduct for medical practitioners as well 
as establish the Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal (MDPDT). The MDPDT is 
mandated to determine cases of professional misconduct against medical personnel and appeals from its 
decisions go straight to the Court of Appeal. It is thus accorded the status of a High Court, a superior 
court of record in the country. 
29
 BENJAMIN O NWABUEZE Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa-Role of Courts in 
Government
  
(C Hurst &Company London 1977) 75. 
30
 Brigadier-General Togun (Rtd.) V Hon. Justice Chukwudifu Oputa (Rtd.) & 2 others and 
General Ibrahim Babangida & 1 Other [2001] 16 NWLR pt 740, 597 at 662 (cases consolidated on 
the orders of the court). Hereafter, Togun v Oputa (No.2), 645. 
31 For a discussion of the sometimes progressive but wavering judicial construction of this 
constitutional provision see HAKEEM O YUSUF ‘The Judiciary and Political Change in Africa: 
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Objectionable still is the finding that the powers of the Commission contravened fair-
hearing provisions of section 36 of the Nigerian constitution. It is a basic procedural 
practice that has been judicially upheld (in Nigeria and elsewhere) that evidentiary 
rules weigh against a party who fails to utilise reasonable opportunity provided to 
present her case. In such circumstances, the defaulting party can not be heard to 
complain about lack of fair hearing. In vindication of this position, the Court was to 
hold in a later case that such a defaulting party can not ‘turn around to accuse the 
court of denying him fair hearing.’32 It is a matter of the records that in the Oputa 
Panel Case, the generals roundly and publicly rebuffed all available opportunity to 
testify before the Oputa Panel. 
 
The Oputa Panel Case brought to the fore the tension that may arise between the 
truth-seeking process and the judiciary in transition. It highlights the dangers inherent 
in the existence of an accountability gap for the past with respect to the judiciary. 
Such an accountability gap bequeaths a polity with a judiciary that may be immune to 
the changes taking place in the transition environment all around it.
33
 In short, the 
Oputa Panel case laid bare the pitfall constituted by the neglect of judicial 
accountability for past governance in post-authoritarian societies. 
 
4. JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE PAST 
  
  4.1. The judiciary, power and governance 
 
Any institution or group that is able to influence how others experience the 
‘vulnerabilities’ of existence, both as individuals and groups wield ‘social power.’34 
This ability to change an existing state of affairs is the defining feature of power. In 
the power game, there are different groups in active contest for dominance each 
utilising specific inherent advantages to achieve supremacy. The different power bases 
in the struggle to undermine the influence of others become constrained in that quest 
by certain self-limiting factors.
35
 Notwithstanding the ‘self-limiting’ factor of the 
judiciary, namely that it does not initiate the process for the exercise of its power, 
contemporary social experience demonstrates it is endowed with the resources with 
which it can and does influence society. 
 
The judiciary wields power in governance of a nature that can not be ignored. It 
hardly stands to contest that the executive and legislature exercise political power. 
However, the judiciary, in furtherance of its interpretational role mediates political 
power. In the mediatory role, the judiciary stands between the executive and the 
citizen in resolving conflicts in the same way it adjudicates between individuals. It is 
                                                                                                                                 
Developing Transitional Jurisprudence in Nigeria’ (2009) 7 (4) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law (forthcoming). 
32 See the position of the Court in Hon. Muyiwa Inakoju & 17 Ors v Hon. Abraham Adeolu Adeleke 
& 3 Ors [2007] 4 NWLR pt. 1025 p.423 and (2007) 7 NILR 136. Available at: http://www.nigeria-
http://www.nigeria-law.org/LawReporting2007.htm (23 May 2009) per Justice Niki Tobi 35. 
Emphasis mine. 
33
 See generally Yusuf note 7 supra.  
34 GIANFRANCO POGGI Forms of Power (Polity Press Cambridge 2001) 203-204. 
35 POGGI supra. 
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empowered to review the actions of the executive to determine their legality.
36
This 
important role of the judicial function is not obliterated even in authoritarian 
societies.
37
 For the most part however, transitional justice research, particularly with 
reference to institutional accountability, has focused on the role of the executive and 
the legislature in societies that have witnessed gross violations of human rights and 
impunity with scarce attention paid to the judicial function. Yet, so critical is the role 
of the judiciary in the exercise of powers in the modern state that ‘…a government is 
not a government without courts.’38 
 
The commonly articulated transition reform agenda focused on the political branches 
of government at the expense of attention to the judicial situation in transitioning 
polities, is one of the marked failures of the current transition paradigm.
39
 But the 
nature of its role constitutes the judiciary as a major element in the machinery of the 
state. In that vantage position, the judiciary ‘can not avoid the making of political 
decisions’40 in upholding the rule of law in society.  
    
 4.2. The judiciary and the rule of law 
 
Transformation of the judiciary is central to the repositioning of the rule of law as a 
beneficial rather than exploitative principle for the organisation of society as a whole. 
It is certainly the case that some understandings of the rule of law were deployed by 
erstwhile tyrannical regimes in the exercise of power. This was the case in Nazi 
Germany, apartheid South Africa and authoritarian military regimes in Africa, Eastern 
Europe and Latin America. In each case, specific instrumental understandings of law 
were deployed to foster undemocratic, immoral and inhuman policies of 
discrimination, repression and gross violations of human rights. Discrimination laws 
for example were institutionalised in Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa and 
held out as legitimate. 
 
It is suggested that a conception of the rule of law that emphasises or relies on 
‘people-power’ or in more formal terms, popular sovereignty holds strong promise for 
enduring fundamental changes aspired for in transitioning societies. The American 
transition from colonialism, struggle for independence and the pivotal role of the 
people in its constitutional development in the late 18
th
 century in particular, provide 
strong precedent for societies seeking to assert popular power in transitioning states.
 41
 
 
It can be argued that institutional accountability for the past with a view to 
strengthening weak or transforming dysfunctional state institutions is one of the 
fundamental ways to foster the viability of democracy and rule of law. Such 
accountability facilitates acknowledgement of institutional shortcomings crucial to 
                                               
36 MURRAY GLEESON “Public Confidence in the Judiciary” (Judicial Conference of Australia, 
Launceston, 27 April 2002) available at: http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/cj/cj_jca.htm (7 March 
2007) 5. 
37 MOUSTAFA note 2 supra. 
38 HENRY M HART AND HERBERT WECHSLER Federal Courts and the Federal System (2nd 
Edition Mineola New York Foundation Press Inc.  1973) 6 
39 H KWASI PREMPEH “Judicial Review and Challenge of Constitutionalism in Contemporary 
Africa” (2006) 80 Tulane Law Review 1239-1323, 1299. 
40 JOHN A G GRIFFITH The Politics of the Judiciary (5th Edition Fontana London 1997) 292-3.  
41 LARRY D KRAMER The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 
(Oxford University Press Oxford 2004). 
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achieving transformation of state institutions. It also constitutes a definitive 
progression to democratic governance and movement away from repression.
42
 
 
Proceeding on our adopted view of rule of law, a publicly accessible process of 
scrutiny offered by the truth-seeking mechanism can be expected to restore some 
measure of judicial credibility and public confidence in the judiciary in such post-
authoritarian contexts. To insist otherwise namely that any institution is beyond public 
scrutiny conducted in a plainly public manner afforded by a truth-seeking process 
amounts to conceding to the judiciary ‘a real omnipotence.’43 This is precisely a 
privilege the judiciary has been all too ready to deny the political branches of 
government through the instrumentality of judicial review. More crucially, such a 
proposition is tantamount to a direct inversion of popular sovereignty and the 
imposition of ‘judicial supremacy.’44 Further, the truth-seeking mechanism offers the 
opportunity for obtaining comprehensive accounts for past governance and the 
institutional role of the judiciary in it. 
 
4.3. Integrity v accountability: two normative arguments 
 
There are however, a number of possible objections that can be raised against the case 
for judicial accountability for its role in past governance as part of transitional justice 
arrangements. The most important are essentially of a normative character. Most 
prominent in this category is the integrity argument. For clarity, this will be 
considered from two related but distinct perspectives, the need for institutional 
independence and immunity of judicial officers. 
   
4.3.1 Judicial independence 
 
It is possible to argue that there is an evident tension between the doctrine of judicial 
independence and the truth-seeking mechanism even in the context of transition. In 
other words, the imperative of judicial independence can not be reconciled with 
bringing the judiciary to account for its role in past governance through a public 
mechanism like a truth commission. The fundamental doctrinal basis of the principle 
of judicial independence is the desire to obviate potential constraints to the exercise of 
judicial power. Institutional independence is necessary to secure the role of the 
judiciary as the institution charged with protection of the individual from oppression. 
In view of this essence of the judicial function, public accountability of the nature 
proposed here has the potential to erode, if not critically subvert the integrity of the 
judiciary. 
 
It is important to acknowledge that judicial integrity is a value which needs to be 
maintained perhaps even more in the context of transitional societies than any other. 
This was in fact a major argument in the resistance of the South Africa judiciary to the 
attempt to bring it to account for its role in apartheid before the Truth and 
                                               
42 FIONNUALA NI AOLAIN and COLM CAMPBELL “The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted 
Democracies” (2005) 27 Human Rights Quarterly 172, 184, 207. 
43 Ibid at 178. 
44 WILLIAMS J WATKINS JR. “Popular Sovereignty, Judicial Supremacy and the American 
Revolution: Why the Judiciary Cannot be the Final Arbiter of Constitutions” (2006) Duke Journal of 
Constitutional Law and Public Policy 159 [Online Edition] 1, 41. 
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Reconciliation Commission.
45
 In his analysis of the South Africa experience, 
Dyzenhaus offers valuable insight that challenges this position. The judicial branch, 
he argues, ought to be held up to scrutiny on its allegiance to law or what he refers to 
as ‘fidelity to law.’ This is what the judicial oaths of office require. What is to be 
considered as law and fidelity, to which judges are bound, is an approach that ‘accords 
recognition to reciprocity between the rulers and the ruled.’46 
 
The point then is that judicial independence should not be constituted into a shield 
against giving public accounts of the judicial role during an authoritarian period. An 
account of the judicial role during the period provides opportunity for an assessment 
of whether the judiciary did maintain its independence at the relevant time. Public 
scrutiny of the nature afforded by a truth-seeking mechanism provides opportunity to 
examine whether the judicial function was performed in a manner that accorded 
primacy to law as required by judicial (oath of) office. Or, in the converse (and this is 
the crux of the matter), did any extraneous but contextual factor intervene to 
compromise judicial independence properly conceived? The necessity for this would 
appear self-evident.  Stated a bit differently, judicial independence as a shield against 
accountability of the judiciary for the past can be challenged on its own terms. In all 
of its importance for the adjudicatory role, and dispensation of justice, it ought not to 
be allowed to override the need for accountability for powers conferred on any 
institution of state in terms of the process and outcomes of the exercise of such 
powers. 
 
In its conception, judicial independence, like judicial power itself, is designed for the 
benefit of citizens.
47
 While the argument for judicial independence may be a strong 
one, it ought to be borne in mind that judicial independence is not a perquisite of 
judicial office. It is commonly recognised that respect for courts is essentially directed 
at the institution and not the person of the individual judge. Respect for and 
compliance with judicial decisions rest (at least to an appreciable extent) on the belief 
in the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. It is not designed to cast a 
sanctimonious cloak around individual judges. This is central to any power or 
authority the judiciary can aspire to have in society.
48
 
 
4.3.2. Judicial immunity 
 
The other aspect of the argument as stated earlier is the related but distinct case for 
protecting judges from fear (of suit) in the discharge of their duties. This is the 
principle of judicial immunity. Legislation, statutory or constitutional, barring litigants 
or other interested parties from taking out legal action against judicial officers is one 
of the most potent measures for securing the independence of judicial officers. 
Political office holders are also sometimes protected from suit in the discharge of their 
functions. But this is normally for a limited period. Judicial immunity from suit is 
however usually more comprehensive and enduring in its operation, commonly 
extending beyond the tenure of judicial office. 
                                               
45 DYZENHAUS note 26 supra.  
46
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47
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Conference London, September 2005) available at: 
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The principle has been institutionalised to extinguish any threat of litigation on the 
judge for performing the normal functions of the office. Discernible in the 
entrenchment of judicial immunity is the view that the nature of judicial function 
requires an independence of ‘mind’ that addresses itself to ensuring justice according 
to law. The position is further strengthened by the view that judicial misconduct is 
appropriately addressed through ‘structural’ mechanisms of appeal procedure and in 
extreme cases, dismissal from office.
49
 
 
The judicial calling must stand outside of the whims of individuals as well as 
institutions and particularly one that trumps the common weal. Where it is possible to 
surmise that the judiciary has been complicit in the violations of human rights by the 
state under an illiberal regime, this supports a case for accountability for what could 
well amount to judicial abdication of its role. In other words, there ought to be a valid 
departure from the norm of traditional conceptions of judicial independence in 
troubled societies where there is ample causes to believe judges have deviated from 
keeping faith with their judicial oaths of office. This should be the case where such 
oaths-as they commonly do- required the discharge of the functions in a manner 
consistent with the constitutional values of the country as against the wishes of 
authoritarian rulers. Whether this is factually the case or otherwise has to be tested 
through a process of public accounting, at the least, to set the records straight. 
 
Scrutiny of the judiciary through a truth-seeking process during a period of 
fundamental political change as proposed here is distinct from subjecting individual 
judges to the indignity of civil suits for their judgements. In the event there is some 
measure of consensus that the judicial function has been conducted in some 
inappropriate manner, the need to reach beyond the shield of judicial immunity 
assumes an imperative. This is important for achieving societal transformation and 
reconstruction, pivotal objects of transitional justice in societies with an experience of 
authoritarianism or conflict. It serves to further scrutinise the validity of these 
normative objections to public accountability of the judiciary for the past in the 
context of the Nigerian post-authoritarian experience. 
  
5. AN UNACCOUNTED JUDICIARY AND A TROUBLED TRANSITION 
 
The military left the Public Service structures intact throughout the period of 
authoritarian rule.
50
 But it took over the executive and legislative functions all over 
the country along with a ban on political activities. Throughout the period of 
authoritarian rule, the judiciary remained the only institution that survived the 
suspension and take over of the institutions of governance.
51
 The military did arrogate 
to itself the power to appoint judges but the judiciary did not experience any 
institutional truncation. By default, the judiciary took an active part in governance 
throughout the period. It is thus arguably complicit in the misgovernance and 
violations of human rights in the country in the three decades of military.  
                                               
49
 PAMELA S KARLAN “Two Concepts of Judicial Independence” (1999) 72 Southern California 
Law Review 535, 539 and ROBERT C WATERS “Judicial Immunity vs. Due Process: When Should a 
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51 Ibid. 
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5.1. The judiciary in authoritarianism 
 
Despite their disdain for constitutionalism and human rights, authoritarian rulers 
usually exhibit a paradoxical interest in obtaining some veneer of legality for their 
illegitimate hold on power.
52
 Even the military class in its foray into governance is 
obliged to secure a veneer of legitimacy for the effective exercise of political power. 
In the pursuit of that objective, they usually leave the judicial institution intact, 
unsuspended like the political branch.
53
 The military find an opportunity for 
legitimation through retaining the judicial institution. And this was the case in 
Nigeria.  The self-serving motive has been aptly described by Tayyab Mahmud: 
“Usurpers appear to recognize that judicial pronouncements 
about the nature and merits of the change and quantum of 
their legislative capacity have an impact on the legitimacy of 
the new regime, because words like law” and “legality” 
function as titles of honor…Securing judicial recognition 
appears to be the key to gaining political legitimacy.”54 
 
Apart from the legitimacy value, there is the unavoidable necessity for the judicial 
institution even in authoritarian societies. In contrast to executive and legislative 
governance, the more nuanced requirements of adjudication or judicial governance 
are well beyond the disposition or capacity of military adventurers in power. The 
incapacity on the part of the military to administer the judicial function necessitates 
the retention of the judiciary in governance. The specialised nature of the judicial 
function constitutes a positive force which the judiciary ought to have utilised in the 
quest to maintain its institutional integrity, uphold human rights and rule of law 
irrespective of the duress constituted by authoritarian military rule.
55
  
   
Successive military administrations foisted untold hardship and suffering on the mass 
of the people.
56
 What role did or could have the judiciary played in that suffering? 
This ought to have constituted an important thematic focus of the truth-seeking 
process in Nigeria in view of its broad terms of reference. Part of its remit was to 
‘identify the person or persons, authorities, institutions or organisations which may be 
held accountable’ for gross violations of human rights and determine the motives for 
the violations or abuses. The judiciary had become largely impotent in upholding the 
rights of individuals in the era of military rule in the country. In frustration, a Justice 
of the Supreme Court boldly advised victims of rights violations to seek redress 
through means other than the judicial process. He concluded that the military left no 
one in doubt as to the inviolability of their decrees.
57
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Such judicial apologia was borne as much out of a sense of frustration of the courts 
with the importunate and contemptuous treatment of judicial decisions (and the 
institution as a whole) by successive military administrations as from an attempt at 
self-preservation. In a way though, it reinforces the need for accountability for the 
nature of judicial governance during the years of authoritarian rule. How or why was 
this possible? The root of judicial apologia in the Nigerian context is not unconnected 
with the legitimation of military rule in the first instance by the judiciary.  
   
On the onset of military rule, the courts, after a brief and in retrospect, weak 
resistance, upheld the illegal putsch as a ‘revolution.’ The Supreme Court held that 
the coup d’etat legitimately upstaged the Grundnorm as represented by the country’s 
republican constitution of 1963.
58
 The legitimation of authoritarian rule then came 
back in its turn to haunt the judiciary. As the Oputa Panel found, at the end of 
military rule, the courts and judges had become ‘toothless bull dogs.’59 This ought not 
to have been the case considering that the judges at all times owed a duty to the 
Constitution.  In this regard, it is significant for instance that the judicial oaths of 
office were contained in the Constitution at all times. All the constitutions in 
operation throughout the period of authoritarian rule contained supremacy clauses. 
All judges were in fact sworn on the constitution rather than military legislation 
hence the legal and moral justification for holding them to their constitutionally 
prescribed oaths of judicial office.  
  
It is thus arguable that the empirical record of the Nigerian judiciary in the period of 
authoritarian rule commends the imperative of accountability for the performance of 
the judicial function. This state of affairs commends the need for an enquiry on why 
the judges took to the path of compromise when their judicial oaths of office require 
fidelity to law as stated by the Constitution rather than military legislation. The 
compromised status of the Nigerian judiciary is further exacerbated by a legacy of 
questionable appointments characterised by nepotism and prebendalism. The 
compromised and corrupt judicial function generated a lacklustre attitude within the 
public for recourse to due process of law in the resolution of disputes. This is the state 
of the judiciary at the point the country moved to civil governance on 29 May 1999. 
 
5.2. The judiciary in the post-authoritarian period  
 
Governance in Nigeria is confronted by several complexities in this period of its 
longest experience of civil rule in its post-independence. A good number of the 
complexities derive from the peculiar dynamics of a post-colonial, post-authoritarian 
state with heterogeneous identities. The complexities include rising crime rates, 
poverty, unemployment, the deplorable state of social infrastructure, and the failure of 
transitional justice measures for past victims of gross violations of human rights in 
which the judiciary as discussed above is implicated.  Further, the fallouts of a grossly 
manipulated electoral process and the legitimacy deficit concomitant to it have deep 
resonance for the emergence of the judicialisation of politics as a prominent feature of 
governance in the country, particularly from 2003 to date.  
   
                                               
58
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 17 
However, the most serious challenge to Nigeria’s continued viability as a functional 
state has been posed by intergovernmental disputes over spheres of power in a 
lopsided federation.
60
These have been accompanied by an unhealthy wrangling for 
power among the political elite, pervasive corruption and the absence of effective 
dialogue to foster a consensual basis for the continued existence of the polity among 
various stakeholders. The judiciary, particularly the appellate courts, has been 
inundated with ‘political cases’ and has become a strategic actor in policy-decision 
making and governance at a level unprecedented in Nigeria’s history.61  
  
One can conveniently cite over a dozen remarkable cases of judicialisation of politics 
in the country in the context of the democratic transition at the inter-governmental 
level.
62
 A topical survey would include Attorney General of the Federation v Attorney 
General of Abia and 35 Ors
63
dealing with disputed claims between the federal and 
littoral States for oil resources derivable from the continental shelf of the country; 
Attorney General of Ondo State v Attorney General of the Federation & 35 Ors (the 
ICPC Case)
64
 dealing with the establishment of a monolith anti-corruption agency in 
the federation; Attorney General of the Federation v Attorney General of Abia and 35 
Ors (No.2)
65
 and Attorney General of Ogun State v Attorney General of the 
Federation
66
 both dealing (again) with fiscal federalism and allegations of illegal 
withholding of funds by the Federal government. 
  
Attorney General of Lagos State v Attorney General of the Federation
67
 centred on 
disputations over the propriety of inherited military legislation that confers ultimate 
planning powers on the federal government, possessed only of complete geo-political 
control over the federal capital territory. All the states of the federation challenged the 
constitutionality of certain sections of the Electoral Act (promulgated by the National 
Assembly), in as much as it sought to make provisions for elections into local 
(government) authorities in Attorney General of Abia and 35 Ors v Attorney General 
of the Federation.
68
   
 
The disputations over the appropriate spheres of power and control in the country 
between the federal government on one hand, and the states on the other, were so 
frequent. In the result, there was a seeming endless recourse to the judiciary for 
resolution. Customisation of this approach to governance and the extensive 
judicialisation of politics it generated attracted notice and obiter dicta of the Supreme 
Court. In one case, it observed that ‘this is yet another open quarrel between the State 
                                               
60 SOLA AKINRINADE “Constitutionalism and the Resolution of Conflicts in Nigeria” (2003) 368 
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and Federal Government’ with which it had become ‘thoroughly familiar.’69 The 
situation in the country is attributable to the un-negotiated transition from decades of 
military rule. This has forced to the centre stage of governance, unresolved and 
unmediated tensions arising from the country’s de jure federal status that has 
witnessed a transformation to a de facto unitary state. These remain critical issues that 
were left unaddressed in the process of political change.  
 
However, the impact of the judicialisation of politics has raised serious concerns on 
the decisional independence and integrity of judicial officers. In Nigeria, the most 
prominent of the concerns centres on judicial ineptitude and corruption (or simply 
apprehensions of it), especially in the lower courts and throughout the system.
70
 It is 
instructive that the recent decision of the Presidential Elections Petition Tribunal 
(PET) on the 2007 elections did not escape the allegations of corruption that dogged 
the steps and seriously compromised the adjudication of the 2003 elections in the 
country.
71
 Even the Supreme Court which finally decided the matter was not spared. 
This led Justice Tobi, one of the justices who sat on the panel of the decisive final 
appeal in the highly contentious election petition
72
 to warn litigants (politicians) to 
stop calling judges ‘all sorts of names.’ In obvious exasperation, the learned justice 
wondered why judges are not trusted by the public in the administration of justice.
73
  
 
It is suggested that the persistence of real or imagined corruption in the judiciary is a 
product of the existential continuity of the institution in the transition process. The 
ambivalence towards the courts will arguably remain the case as long as the matter of 
judicial accountability for past complicity in misgovernance during the country’s 
authoritarian past remains completely ignored or under-addressed.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
At all times, but especially in the circumstances of transition and political change 
from an authoritarian past, the judiciary must be wary of designs through recourse to 
judicial process to frustrate transitional justice measures. This is particularly important 
for the restoration and fortification of rule of law in a transitional setting. Such 
awareness appears to have been lost on the Nigerian Courts in the Oputa Panel Case.  
The judiciary thus fostered a situation whereby the strong determination of the 
generals not to appear before the Oputa Panel introduced a twist to the truth-seeking 
process from which it never recovered. 
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It has been argued that the role of the judiciary in governance in authoritarian societies 
necessarily raises the need for scrutiny of the judicial function as an integral aspect of 
transitional justice arrangements. This is because a critical assessment of judicial 
impact on the course of governance and the exercise of state powers provides a 
comprehensive account of the past. Such accountability for the past also confronts the 
judiciary with its role in governance, facilitates acknowledgement and opens the way 
for desired institutional transformation where required. This is premised in part on 
contemporary social experience that the judiciary as one of the institutions of the state 
participates in governance at all times. The conduct of that role in authoritarian 
societies merits account at times of socio-political change. 
 
What emerges from the Nigerian experience is that accountability for the role of the 
judiciary in governance during an authoritarian period is relevant because of certain 
standards and societal expectations of the institution. Where such expectations are not 
met, it leads to the lack of public trust and confidence in the judicial system which is 
fatal to societal cohesion, peace and development. Since the judiciary commands 
neither the money controlled by the legislature nor the force at the service of the 
executive, public confidence is at the heart of obedience to judicial decisions.
74
 It is 
not at all challenging to establish such a state of affairs in transitional societies that 
had laboured under authoritarian rule, war, institutionalised discrimination like 
apartheid or other forms of substantial social displacement. Thus the significance of 
incorporating judicial accountability into transitional justice processes. 
 
The judiciary in post-authoritarian societies is usually privileged in at least two ways 
which accentuate the need for accountability for the past. First, it actively participates 
in governance and may by the reason of such participation be complicit for misrule 
and violation of human rights. Thus, unlike the political institutions which invariably 
suffer from suspension or abrogation by authoritarian rulers, it benefits from an 
institutional memory in the post-authoritarian period. This gives it an edge over the 
political organs of the state in governance at the crucial period of consolidating 
political change in transitional societies. Indeed, it usually takes the strategic position 
of mediator in state-society, intra- and inter-governmental disputations and rights 
claims. Secondly, and connected to the first is the need by authoritarian regimes for 
the judicial function despite their dubious claims to messianic executive and 
legislative capabilities as was commonly the case in military regimes in Nigeria. This 
strategic positioning of the judiciary makes the case for judicial accounts for its role in 
past governance more compelling. 
 
The dynamics of transitional justice lends itself to Karlan’s argument that the claim to 
judicial independence must be balanced against actual judicial outcomes.
75
 The 
positive values of judicial immunity (and more broadly, independence) 
notwithstanding, an absolutist interpretation of it could seriously undermine other 
equally important societal values.
76
 Society as a body corporate stands above its 
institutions. It is entitled to an account as principal, for exercise of powers devolved to 
any of its agents, parts or institutions as surrogates in furtherance of the common 
weal. The judiciary as one of such surrogates is thereby not excluded. The operation 
                                               
74 GLEESON note 47 supra at1-2. 
75
KARLAN note 49 supra at 558. 
76
 Ibid. at 539. 
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of normative or other principles as a shield for judicial accounts for the past in post-
authoritarian contexts, no matter how important, simply lack legitimacy. 
 
